TEMPERANCE REVISITED
A Call for Restraint in Contemporary Australia

Proceedings of a Seminar

held at

Warrane College,
University of New South Wales

on

2\textsuperscript{nd} May 2009
TEMPERANCE REVISITED

A Call for Restraint in Contemporary Australia

Edited by

Phillip Elias
BA (Hons) BSc (Med) MB BS (UNSW)
Dip Ed St (CoT, London)

Senior Academic Adviser, Warrane College

Warrane College Monograph No.18
Temperance Revisited

Warrane College is an affiliated residential college for men at The University of New South Wales. It encourages students to prepare for their future roles in society by promoting academic excellence, high personal standards and a spirit of service in a friendly environment. Lectures, seminars, educational programs, work-camps in underdeveloped societies, and local community service projects to serve both the University and the wider community, are sponsored by the College. Opus Dei, a Prelature of the Catholic Church, is responsible for the spiritual care of the College.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Warrane College.

The contents of this publication are refereed conference proceedings for the Restraint Project, UNSW.

ISBN 0 980 2902 5 2

Published by Warrane College,
PO Box 123, Kensington, NSW, 1465, Australia

© Warrane College, Sydney, Australia

September 2009
Contents

Foreword

Phillip Elias

About the Authors

Temperance in Australia: The Restraint Project

James Franklin

From Moral to Medical: the Retreat of Self-Control in Australia in the Twentieth Century

Judy Stove

Self-Control in the Big Scheme of Things

Andrew Mullins

Temperance and the Modern Temper: Aristotle and Aquinas Revisited

Lucy Smith

Endnotes

Warrane Monographs
The Warrane Seminars have been running for some years now and their purpose is quite simply to take a deeper philosophical and historical look at newsworthy issues in Australia today. One recent seminar examined the influence of postmodernism in education, at a time when much was being made of the ‘dumbing down’ of curricula. Another seminar looked at relativism and human rights, at a time when the Northern Territory intervention was receiving a great deal of attention.

This year the focus is on temperance. Australians have enjoyed decades of prosperity and have imbibed ideas from consumerism- that self control is a bad thing, and from biologism- that we aren’t really in control of ourselves. But when alcohol-fuelled athletes start misbehaving and young people subject themselves to all manner of addictions, we are scandalised and demand an explanation.

Surprisingly, the answer might not come from NSW Health pamphlets or sporting disciplinary commissions. It may indeed come from an ancient philosophical tradition, one that had manifestations in various social institutions and traditions until the middle of the twentieth century. Specifically, what we are facing may be a lack of temperance.

Someone suggested an alternative, punchier title for the seminar: “Here’s to Jonesy He’s True Blue: Is Temperance in the 21st Century Un-Australian?” Temperance is a hard sell. It tends to conjure up in us images of teetotallers preaching damnation to drinkers. The fact that we don’t immediately think of temperance as one of the key virtues needed for the good life as described by Plato and Aristotle should lead us to look at the topic more thoughtfully. The papers that follow aim to help us do this.
Temperance Revisited

About the Authors

*James Franklin* is a Professor in the School of Mathematics and Statistics at the University of New South Wales. He is the director of the Restraint Project.

*Judy Stove* is a Researcher with the Restraint Project, UNSW.

*Andrew Mullins* is the headmaster of Redfield College, Dural. He is the author of ‘Parenting for Character’.

*Lucy Smith* is a Researcher with the Restraint Project, UNSW.
Temperance in Australia: The Restraint Project

James Franklin

For the last three years, I have been in charge of the “Restraint Project” (www.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/restraintproj.html), which used an ARC grant to examine the virtue of temperance, or self-control, in the Australian context.

1. THE PROBLEM: ADDICTIONS AND UNRESTRAINED HARMFUL BEHAVIOURS

There is a great variety of addictions, binges and self-harming behaviours “out there”. People harm themselves and destroy their lives by enslavement to them. They are mostly well-known. Let’s run through them quickly.

- Alcoholism is an old favourite. Binge drinking is still common; many fatal car accidents and assaults have alcohol as a contributing cause; in remote indigenous communities fetal alcohol syndrome permanently destroys the brains of babies.

- The Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008 report on “Risk Taking by Young People” records such figures as: 12% of people aged 18-24 years reported being physically assaulted by a man during the last 12 months; 23% of people aged 15-24 years reported using illicit drugs during the last 12 months; 19% of young men aged 18-24 years reported that they had engaged in risky/high risk drinking at least once a week during the last 12 months.
Gambling: The manager of Melbourne’s Platform 66 Tabaret says of Dec 11, 2008, when the government’s $1400 bonus arrived in pensioners’ accounts, “there was a long line of them queueing to get in when I came to open up at 8am … we ended up calling it ‘Kevin Rudd Thursday’.”

Credit card debt: In 2006 Australians applied for a record 3.7 million credit cards and a third of these applications came from the 18-to-27 age group. *SMH* columnist Lisa Pryor points out that it is not all about buying “stuff”: “A lot of young people with credit card debt think they are buying abstract nouns – experiences, memories, togetherness, exploration and freedom. When you use debt to buy abstract nouns you can explain away the guilt. You are not a shallow materialist living beyond your means if you slap air fares, mobile phone bills and scuba diving lessons on the plastic. Oh no. You are simply living life to the fullest.”

Obesity remains an intractable and increasing problem, as does anorexia, which is a kind of addiction to self-controlling behaviour.

The porn industry is huge: there are a lot of guys sitting at a lot of computers hooked on disturbing and degrading images of sex.

Kevin Rudd blames the Global Financial Crisis on the greed of “unrestrained capitalism”; that is not entirely convincing as actual capitalism is very restrained (by e.g. tort law and compliance regimes), but it is still true that there is plenty of greed in the business world.

Workaholism: some medicine and law students and graduates are unable to stop themselves working 60 or 80 hours a week, to the detriment of their human relationships.
Temperance Revisited

• A little known breakdown in old habits of self-control, worked on by Anna Christie for the Restraint Project, is that the average age of toilet training in Western countries has drifted about a year later than what is was in the 1960s.

To speak of those high-profile addictions may give the impression that it is all about other people. That is not entirely true. Most people, even if free of disabling addictions, have some, shall we say, over-frequent indulgences that they would be better off containing. Too many video games the night before exams? Sleeping in and sleeping between lectures? Taking meaningless Facebook quizzes instead of studying? Working out at the gym twice a day? If you don’t have something like that hidden away, it’s likely that either you’re a touch autistic or else a working mother and too busy.

Of course, the sky isn’t falling. While some people are in the grip of addictions, most aren’t, and that needs explaining too. One of the successes of our society is the general restraint of personal and political violence. It is safe, almost always, to walk through the streets to attend a talk such as this, and there hasn’t been and isn’t going to be a military coup in Canberra. Those achievements would be good to understand.

So what exactly is wrong with addiction? It would be good to state that clearly, especially as not everyone is convinced there really is something wrong with it. The Libertarians’ view is that freedom isn’t worth much unless it includes the freedom to harm yourself. “Whose life is it anyway?”, they ask.

The answer is that lack of self-control harms yourself, and harming yourself is wrong because you are a being of immense worth. You have a duty to look after yourself because of who you are: a valuable human. As well as that, being in the grip of an addiction makes you unable to look after
those who depend on you and have a right to your help. Those who have suffered from having an alcoholic parent will understand the point best.

2. THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Given that addictions are destroying people, what can be done about it? Contemporary thinking has two main ideas on what to do, ideas which are useful as far as they go but which leave out something essential.

The first idea is to scare people with stories of risk and harm, for example to teach young teens about the consequences that drug-taking or unprotected sex could lead to. That is a start, but it presumes a prior disposition on the part of the listeners to be afraid of what might happen to them, that is, to have a wish to protect themselves. That is not always true, and it is especially not true of the people most at risk – their problem is exactly that they are not concerned about looking after themselves. Either they have low self-esteem and think “why bother”, or they have a hormone-driven desire to seek out risk instead of avoiding it. If those prior issues of disposition are not addressed first, scare stories will be like water off a duck’s back.

The second idea commonly found in addressing addictions is analysis of causal “factors” associated with them, such as poverty, race, characteristics of parents, hormonal imbalances and so on. Judy Stove’s paper will explain how the twentieth century came to over-estimate those factors and use them to replace talk about moral issues and decisions. Undoubtedly such factors are relevant – for example, the fact that the rate of teenage pregnancy in Walgett is thirteen times what it is on the lower North Shore suggests inquiry into the differences between those two communities. But too much concentration on those factors begins to see a person as a heap of factors
Temperance Revisited

out of their control, instead of a real person facing a decision. When it comes to policy, it implies that long-term action on sociopolitical factors is more important than equipping people with the skills they need to think about their decisions.

A more person-focused and morally-informed plan is needed, which addresses the point where a person needs to take a decision on what to actually do when tempted by something harmful. It recognizes that someone under peer pressure to take a dangerous drug is in the end on their own with a decision to make. That is where the virtue of temperance or self-restraint comes in.

What the virtue of temperance is: it is having the habit of being able to stop and think, is this behaviour that I’m tempted to do harmful, then if it is, having the strength to avoid doing it.

Simple: it’s just doing it that’s hard.

This view of temperance fits into a wider story about the place of virtues in ethics: Plato and Aristotle put forward four “cardinal” virtues, that is, persistent moral habits necessary for living a good life: in addition to temperance, there were justice, courage and prudence. Christian writers added the “theological virtues” of faith, love and charity, and Thomas Aquinas organised his whole discussion of ethics around those virtues. That approach to ethics is significantly different from the modern one of seeing it as essentially about deciding what actions are right and wrong. It is not incompatible with that, but it concentrates much more on global questions about the person: about the sort of character you want to be – your life narrative, so to speak, the overall story you have about where your life is going and the sort of person you want to be, into which you will fit individual decisions.
Temperance Revisited

And at a more basic ethical level, both virtues and decisions about the rightness of actions should be explained in terms of the most basic ethical concept, the worth of persons. That is easy in the case of temperance: temperate people are both protecting themselves from harm and enabling themselves to help others who need their help.

Temperance and the other virtues also fit into a certain conception of what the human mind is like – one that sees the mind as a theatre where reason or conscience (that understands what is right) and the passions create a drama. They sometimes cooperate, as when someone’s passion for justice motivates them to take forceful action, but at other times they conflict, as when temptations and weakness of will conspire to create a gap between what someone knows they ought to do and what they actually do. That is a view that will be familiar to anyone with a Catholic upbringing. I’m not sure how natural it looks to anyone else.

The virtue-based approach to ethics is a creation of non-religious Greek philosophers and its relation to religious perspectives is not entirely clear. Although temperance is mentioned briefly in St Paul and the Old Testament, Jesus does not express himself explicitly in terms of virtues. But that is because he is doing something more basic. His emphasis on love has obvious consequences for the necessity of virtues. A parent’s love for a child implies the need to stay sober to look after them.

As to theory about the virtue of temperance specifically, there is not a great deal that is useful. But there is something of interest in Aristotle’s distinction between temperance and continence. Continence strictly speaking means being able to overcome a strong desire to do something wrong. Temperance means having a well-ordered set of desires so one does not have the temptation in the first place, which is, Aristotle says, a lot better. That can make the temperate person sound cold-blooded, but an
example like child pornography may make Aristotle’s point look more convincing. Someone who can overcome strong urges to download child porn deserves praise, but there is still something disordered about having that desire, and one is a better human being without it. Something similar is true of many addictions: Alcoholics Anonymous urges its members to recognize that they always have something wrong with them in that they are really still addicts who must always be on guard against a relapse.

3. SELLING THE PRODUCT

If it is agreed that the virtue of temperance is desirable, there is then the problem of how to sell it. It is not easy.

For a start, it is inherently not an easy virtue to love. Justice is easy – most people can get quickly fired up about unfairness. But temperance is a touch self-centred, perhaps even small-minded. It is easy to admire “larger than life” characters with lots of passions and appetites, and correspondingly find the temperate person a bit of a cold fish.

There is also some disinformation and caricatures to cope with coming from those of other views. The central one of these, at least in Australia, is the image of the “wowser”, a narrow-minded person who is not having much fun and tries to prevent other people having any either. Like many caricatures, there is something in it, since there are such people, but the way it works in debate is to smear the opposition with things they didn’t say. An attack on temperance from another direction comes from the “factors” people who blame poverty and other social causes for addictions; according to them, trying to give people skills of self-control is an exercise in blaming the victim. There are also tricky issues to deal with over how much control
should be left to people themselves and where it should be supplemented by
restraint from outside, such as legal prohibition of drugs.

Then there is the problem of language and the general trend of thought
since the Sixties. The language of virtues has largely disappeared from public
discourse and any use of such words as virtue, honour, temperance, self-
control, modesty, decency and so on is likely to sound “out of the Ark”.

With that minefield to negotiate, the first thing is to get straight the
core of the message to be delivered. It’s “Look after yourself”. That gets to
the point of temperance as a matter of protection against self-harm. It also
has a chance of being direct enough to get through to those whose
addictions are a result of damaged self-esteem, due for example to some
form of abuse. They in particular need to be reminded frequently that they
are worth caring about. And it reinforces to more fortunate people the
reason why one should avoid glamorous but risky behaviour.

The next thing is to start early. We’d better begin with toilet training.
Then it is a matter of education taking seriously the development of
character. Andrew Mullins’ paper will discuss how to do that.

Then we need to provide role models that make plain why temperance
is admirable, models that one would want to imitate. For example, a
teenager who avoids alcohol at a party so as to be able to drive friends home
safely has a character to be proud of. Everyone can understand why.
Fortunate people have adequate role models in their parents, and it is good
to be explicit about that. There are various real examples where it is easy to
see the point of restraint and self-sacrifice: A new mother has to sacrifice
sleep night after night to attend to a baby. A wartime boffin spends every
waking hour for years on cryptography because no one else has the skills to
decode messages about U-boat attacks. A married couple, no longer even
friends, stays together for the sake of the children. The last single child of aged parents stays to look after them.

Literature can also be helpful. Jane Austen knows what she’s doing in making self-indulgent characters look stupid and restrained ones look intelligent and admirable.

But we have certainly lost the ability they had in the mid-century to make these virtues attractive. Perhaps it is time to recover how they did it. The true classic is the last scene of the world’s greatest movie, *Casablanca* (1943). Rick (Humphrey Bogart) and Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) are in love and plan to stay behind in Casablanca when her husband, Victor, a resistance hero, flies out. But they realise Victor needs her in support of his crucial work. Rick and Ilsa renounce their love in the interests of the higher cause. “I'm no good at being noble,” Rick says, “but it doesn't take much to see that the problems of three little people don't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world.” Ilsa and Victor walk across the tarmac, board the plane and take off.
Temperance Revisited

From Moral to Medical: the Retreat of Self-Control in Australia in the Twentieth Century

Judy Stove

(1) Forty-four per cent of Australians considered themselves religious but said religion did not play a central role in their lives, a third said they did not believe in a divine power or in life after death.
Linda Morris, “God’s OK, it’s just the religion bit we don’t like,” Sydney Morning Herald 11 July 2008

(2) There are many parallels between drug dependence and other chronic conditions. As with chronic diseases such as diabetes, hypertension, asthma and arthritis, it is probable that drug dependence involves a combination of genetic, biological, behavioural and environmental factors O’Brien & McLellan (1996) quoted in policy document “Treatment” Alcohol and other Drugs Council of Australia September 2003

The first quote, above, indicates, among other things, that Australians today do not generally believe in divine sanctions on their behaviour. The second quote relates to addiction to alcohol and other drugs, which, in earlier centuries, had always been thought to have had a moral dimension.

The purpose of this paper is to outline the background which has led to the above views being representative of the later twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Because of time and space limitations, the
Temperance Revisited

paper will discuss only a few relevant areas: the decline in adherence to churches; the change from moral attitudes to medical ones in the case of alcohol and addiction; psychoanalysis, sociology and criminology as replacing explicit morality or ethics; and, briefly, the growth in assault cases in Australia as a marker of a move away from individual responsibility.

1. FROM CHRISTIAN TO ‘NO RELIGION’

The following section traces the changes in stated belief of Australians through the census data recorded during the twentieth century. Of course, census data does not show the whole story; it does, however, provide us with perhaps the clearest indication of the trend.

In the 1910 Australian census, 97.55 per cent of the total population of 3,773,801, identified themselves as belonging to the Christian religion (ABS 1910 Year Book: 147.5\(^3\)). In practical terms, this meant that the majority of these would have attended church on Sunday, absorbing doctrinal and moral instruction. Texts used as the basis for sermons would have included those emphasising the importance of self-control, such as Proverbs 25:28 (“He that hath no rule over his own spirit is like a city that is broken down, and without walls”) and Galatians 5:19-24, on self-control over the lusts of the flesh.

In the period 1900 to 1939, church (in both Catholic and Protestant incarnations) formed the basis of social interaction for many people. Church groups held dances and picnics, formed musical bands and sporting teams. Children began in Sunday school and graduated to
Temperance Revisited

the adult groups. Men joined the church sporting team or lodge; women the church guild. Often the social activities had a fund-raising aspect to benefit buildings or charities (Turner 23-25).

By 1941, the percentage of the Australian population (now 6,629,839) identifying as Christian had fallen to 5,727,738, a mere 86.39 per cent (ABS 1941 Year Book: 277.6⁴). The 1961 Year Book reported results from the 1954 census. Of those answering the census question about religion, 99 per cent identified as Christian. One important change from earlier censuses was an increase in those not answering the question (10.3 per cent of males, and 8.7 per cent of females). Another was the dramatic increase in those who reported being of non-Christian religion (an increase of 50 per cent since 1947). Interestingly, though, those reporting that they were of no religion decreased by 10 per cent (ABS 1961 Year Book: 312. Chapter IX⁵). These non-Christian religions are identified only as “Hebrew” or “Other.”

In the 1971 Year Book, a table was simply given for religious affiliations, with no text discussion attached (ABS 1971 Year Book: 135⁶). This summarised the data from the 1961 and 1966 censuses. One significant change between 1961 and 1966 was the decrease of 35,680 persons identifying as Roman Catholic (representing a 3.13 per cent reduction), the only reduction against any Christian denomination in the period. The Church of England, by contrast, showed an increase of 208,533 persons, or 5.68 per cent. (This may reflect, among other things, immigration from the UK in the period.) Against this, however, as the table below shows, there were increases in all the non-Christian categories.
Temperance Revisited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious trends in 1960s Australia (selected)</th>
<th>Total population 1961</th>
<th>10,508,186</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total population 1966</td>
<td>11,550,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>'61 census</td>
<td>% of '61 pop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1,139,649</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>3,668,940</td>
<td>31.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>59,329</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9,475</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>24,762</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>37,550</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>1,102,929</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the 1961 Year Book, which reflected the statistics gathered in the 1950s, the non-Christian section is divided only into “Hebrew” or “Other.” The really significant change is the increase by 151 per cent in the “No religion” category, despite the total number representing less than 1 per cent of the 1966 population. Together with the decrease in the Roman Catholic group – despite continued immigration from Catholic countries such as Italy – this represents an unprecedented social trend.

Just as significantly, the 1981 Year Book had no entry in its index for “Religion”, and no equivalent section in its “Demography” chapter equivalent to that in earlier Year Books. By 1991, the information had been restored. A table summarised the data from the 1971, 1976, 1981
Temperance Revisited

and 1986 censuses, showing that the proportion of total population identifying as Christian decreased from 86.2 per cent to 73 per cent across the period, with those of “not stated or no religion” rose from 13.1 per cent to 25 per cent.7

In the 2001 Year Book, a sizeable section has once again been devoted to religious affiliations. The data across the twentieth century was summarised, showing that the total of those identifying as Christians had reduced from 96.1 per cent in 1901 to 70.9 per cent in 1996. The total of “No religion” (16.6 per cent) plus “Not stated” (9.0 per cent) amounted to over 25 per cent of the total population.8

The overall trend, therefore, is clear. What is harder to define is the complex of factors contributing to it. It is likely that the experiences of the two World Wars shaped public feelings about Christian belief. The horrors suffered by so many people around the world are likely to have caused many believers to question the existence of divine justice, or the extent of divine influence on events.

Considerations such as these, which led in the wider intellectual community to the growth of existentialism, influenced some theological trends. One response to humanly inspired horror was to return to a quasi-Calvinist attitude towards the inadequacy of human reason. This approach had adherents in both Protestant and Catholic traditions (Aubert 1978: 621).

In parallel, the Protestant tradition of social activism in the broadest sense (as practised, for example, in the later nineteenth century by the Women’s Christian Temperance Union) continued to constitute a major focus. With social justice, charity work, and education to the fore, theological issues took second place for most Protestants. The Protestant churches were influential in the
development of counselling and social work services, particularly emphasising new roles for women (Damousi 239-240).

Those moral issues which were concerned with sex became more important (Turner 33). “Mixed marriages”, i.e. between Catholics and non-Catholics, became more common and caused less angst than they had in the 1920s and 1930s (Turner 47).

Increasing social contact with Protestants was inevitable. A writer in the Australian *Catholic Weekly*, in 1967, pointed out that lay Catholics were, commonly, left unsure as to what Protestants actually believed (O'Farrell 1969: 400). It is almost certainly the case that many Protestants were also unsure.

Australian Catholics, however, were also confused. A writer in the *Catholic Worker*, in 1959, complained:

“There has probably never been a time in the history of the Catholic Church in Australia when both Catholics and non-Catholics have been so bewildered as they were from 1943 onward about Catholic duties and rights in the social, industrial and political fields...” (quoted in O'Farrell 1969: 405).

While the writer was particularly referring to the complex political manoeuvring in connection with Communist and counter-Communist groups in Labor and Catholic politics (Turner’s Chapter 26, ‘Catholic Action and the Movement’ is useful), other issues were also implied. The Second Vatican Council began in 1962, of which some outcomes were forward-looking and indicated openness for relationships with other faiths. As a result, many Catholics found it hard to accept that
the church they had been brought up to think of as unchanging, now promoted some radical reforms (Turner 93).

As the 1960s went on, one key issue was contraception. The contraceptive pill was first approved for use by the US FDA in 1960. Legislative changes gradually extended its availability. In 1968, Pope Paul VI issued an encyclical *Humanae Vitae*, subtitled ‘On the Regulation of Birth.’ The preamble indicates that the church was aware of the changes in society: concerns about overpopulation; the growth in roles for women; the dramatic surge in scientific progress; and the requirements for responsible parenthood. However, the Church continued to oppose artificial contraception, as it attempted to interfere with God’s provisions for normal procreation.9

The Australian bishops, in their statement responding to the encyclical, anticipated public reaction:

“Conscience is indeed the ultimate guide of the morality of our actions. However, the Second Vatican Council in its Declaration on Religious Freedom (no. 14) that Christians in the formation of their consciences must be guided by the doctrine of the Church” (in *Catholic Weekly* 8 August 1968: O’Farrell 1969: 413).

Many Australian Catholics did not accept the ruling. A meeting of 500 people at the University of Sydney, organised by married lay Catholics, passed motions that they “could not accept the Pope’s statement on birth control”, and “could not believe that a Catholic, in the formation of his conscience on this matter, is not bound by this statement” (reported in *Catholic Weekly*: O’Farrell 1969: 415; Turner 94).
The issue encapsulated the extent to which the Church wished to assert its moral authority over an issue of vital importance to the lives of its adherents, and the extent to which even those adherents – let alone the rest of the population – were reluctant to admit that authority. In any event, after the 1960s, Catholic fertility remained in line with that of the general population, and is now slightly lower than the national average (Collins 46).

The Church had, after all, less in the way of sanction or threat than in former centuries: the idea that unbelievers, or those living in a way opposed to the will of God or Jesus, would be punished in Hell, had ceased to feature in popular consciousness. In parallel with liberalisation of earthly justice regimes (the death penalty was last applied in the UK in 1964, in Australia in 1967), divine punishment was little appealed to. (This would presumably have disappointed Montesquieu, who maintained that where divine punishment, such as he believed that in Christianity, was less severe, then earthly penalties should be the more harsh; by implication, he believed that the opposite should also hold (1758: vol. II, Book XXIV, chapter XIV, 156).)

Lacking moral authority and a sense of penalty, the church’s influence on human moral decision-making had never been lower. This is partly, it has to be said, because in the period the emphasis of all churches has turned away from moral authority to the more personal issues of individual salvation. For example, the aims of Catholic schools in 1990, as outlined by teachers in Catholic schools, included:

- “total development (religious, intellectual, aesthetic, social, emotional, physical)”;

Temperance Revisited
Temperance Revisited

- “appreciation of and responsibility for the environment”; and

- “a commitment to justice, peace and the development of self and others” (Turner 113).

It might be argued that this is an authentic New Testament-based position, but – or perhaps and - its promotion of moral responsibility or virtue in its students is, at best, tenuous.

To some extent, secular social organisations for young people such as the Scouts took over, during the middle decades of the century, the moral authority which religious authorities were resigning. Such groups saw an increase in popularity during the mid-century. By the 1960s and 1970s, however, these groups also waned in membership, being seen as too militaristic and moralistic for the times. While the Scout law retains such provisions as “the Scout is thrifty”, the main thrust of, say, the Scouts Australia website is with much more contemporary concerns, such as environmentalism.

2. FROM MORAL TO MEDICAL

The gradual loss of religious influence was paralleled by a growth in the authority of medical and psychiatric specialists. While doctors had always been key figures in the proto-Temperance and Temperance movements (Stephen Hales, George Cheyne, and Benjamin Rush were the eighteenth-century founding fathers), this influence grew during the nineteenth century. Norman Kerr, first President of the British Society for the Study of Inebriety (founded in 1884), wrote:
Temperance Revisited

“In drunkenness of all degrees and of every variety, the Church sees only sin; the world the vice; the State the crime. On the other hand the medical profession uncovers a condition of disease” (Lewis 97, quoted in Room 1987: 130).

The rise of medical profession led to the spread of disease concept of conditions, such as drunkenness, which had always had a moral dimension in the past (Lewis 98). In the treatment of mental illness, therapeutic treatments became more popular (in fact, they had been experimented with as early as the late eighteenth century, in such institutions as those of the Quaker William Tuke).

The link with mental illness was particularly strong, because one of the outcomes of alcoholism - as are those of other drug addictions - can be a growth in delusions and other psychiatric symptoms. The line, then, between a problem of self-control (in drinking or drug use in the first place) and a physical problem (the outcome of chronic drinking or drug use) became increasingly blurred. Indeed, the lines between physical and psychiatric symptoms remain blurred even today (Heather and Robertson 1989: 76).

Another important strand, increasingly, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were hereditarian and ultimately eugenist ideas that the mentally ill and alcoholic represented “types” which, left to themselves, would die out (Lewis 101; Damousi 2005: 15). The English psychiatrist Henry Maudsley wrote in 1870s: “No one can escape the tyranny of his organisation; no one can escape the destiny that is innate in him” (Lewis quotes himself, 1988: 9: Lewis 110).

In Australia, the doctor Charles McCarthy pioneered the disease concept of inebriety: as he described it, a “moral insanity dependent
on disease of the brain” (Lewis 103, McCarthy 1888, 9-12). His treatment involved total abstinence from alcohol, rest, sometimes use of opium as sedative, continuous manual occupation, and isolation from outside world (Lewis 103, McCarthy 1888: 54-6).

Was there, after all (it was debated), a difference between dipsomania (a true disease), and “voluntary habitual drunkenness”, except of degree? This question was explored by Frederic Norton Manning, the Australian psychiatrist who was responsible for the development of institutions for the mentally ill which lasted for a century (such as Gladesville in Sydney, see Damousi 2005: 13).

As early as his 1868 report on lunacy administration, Manning pointed out that in the USA, the condition was recognised as a disease. He wrote in 1880:

“Deep-set hereditary dispositions, morbid susceptibilities to disease, and the marvellous ingrained weakness of human nature, go with depressing influences moral and physical, to make up the complex concurrence of conditions which result in insanity” (quoted in Lewis 110).

Manning later admitted the treatment system for confirmed alcoholics had largely failed.

“We must hold [the alcoholic] to be responsible like other men, or we must shut him up and treat him judiciously until he becomes so” (ibid.)
Temperance Revisited

In the twentieth century, hypnosis began to be used in order to stimulate the alcoholic’s will to control himself. Drug treatments were also used, with questionable success; in fact, morphine used in alcohol treatment often resulted in addiction to morphine (and, later, to LSD and other psychotropic drugs; Lewis 112; Stafford 1977). Such treatments, however, were mainly used in private clinics for wealthy clients. Governments were generally reluctant to devote much funding to treatment of a disease still widely perceived to be self-induced.

It was not until the 1960s that a second wave of enthusiasm came about for treating alcoholism as a disease. In 1960, E.M. Jellinek published what came to be the seminal work, *The Disease Concept of Alcoholism*. The ambiguity here is underlined by the fact that Jellinek was able to identify 115 ways in which alcoholism had been categorised as a disease (Heather and Robertson 63). He did, however, emphasise that a key aspect of the conception of alcoholism as a disease was the craving (we recall the ancient Greek *epithumia*, desire), and the alcoholic’s inability to choose other than to drink, even contrary to his volition (Heather and Robertson 68).

By this time, in Australia, the regulation of alcohol had been liberalised in most states. The waves of European immigration after the war led to new drinking patterns, with wine enjoyed as a daily adjunct to meals, rather than solely in pubs. Six-o-clock closing, the Temperance victory of an earlier era, was wound back gradually in state after state. In a new era of tourism, travellers were able to buy a drink on Sunday, or with a meal. A new commitment to treatment came as legislative controls on alcohol declined (Lewis 118).

Yet ironically, it was one strand of alcohol treatment which led, in part, to the next drug wave of the 1960s. By the 1950s, it was the use
Temperance Revisited

of LSD and other psychoactive drugs in the treatment of thousands of chronic alcoholics which disseminated them, first among the scientists involved in their testing (the Sandoz Corporation sent out samples widely to researchers), and later to the wider community (Stafford 1977: 4-11).

The triumph of the disease concept of alcoholism was complete when, in 1979, “alcohol-dependence syndrome” was incorporated into the International Classification of Diseases (Heather and Robertson 84). In recent decades, treatment of alcoholism and other addictions has used both drug treatments and psychotherapy.

The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare publishes data on drug and alcohol treatments. The last nation-wide survey published (2006) noted an increase in “closed treatment episodes” of nearly 4 per cent since the previous survey in 2003-2004 (142,144 over 136,869). "closed treatment episodes” involved counselling, with “withdrawal management” (detoxification) being the first-line treatment for addiction to benzodiazepines.13

Forty-four per cent of “closed treatment episodes” involved counselling, with “withdrawal management” (detoxification) being the first-line treatment for addiction to benzodiazepines.13

The fact that counselling is still, in Australia, the most widely practised treatment tends to undermine the disease concept, as outlined in our beginning quote from the Alcohol and Other Drugs Council of Australia. After all, counselling rarely has any impact on arthritis.

3. FROM MORAL TO UNCONSCIOUS

Another important development during the twentieth century was the rise of psychoanalysis as applied to a range of illnesses and conditions (principally, at the time, the catch-all condition of ‘hysteria’).
Temperance Revisited

In Freud’s schema, the personality consists of three elements (Freud had a fondness for the classical world, and may well have recalled Plato’s tripartite soul of the Republic, or at least the divergent chariot horses of the Phaedrus: Gay 366.)

In the article on ‘Psychoanalysis: Freudian School’ which he wrote for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Freud outlined these elements:

‘“id” which is the reservoir of the instinctive impulses, of an "ego, " which is the most superficial portion of the id and one which is modified by the influence of the external world, and of a "super-ego, " which develops out of the id, dominates the ego and represents the inhibitions of instinct characteristic of man’ (Freud 1926).14

The implications for traditional notions of motivation are profound. If a person represents simply a bundle of such entities, where is his scope for conscious choice of action? No less an authority than Alasdair MacIntyre (later champion of his own variety of virtue ethics) tied himself into knots trying to demonstrate that Freud’s theory did not, after all, result in crude determinism about human action, but – rather – sought to place morality on a more rational footing (MacIntyre 1972: 252).

Freud was also convinced that the sex drive is the ultimate motive force, and was subject to repression. “There is a force in the mind which exercises the functions of a censorship, and which excludes from consciousness and from any influence upon action all tendencies which displease it” (Freud 1926).
This repressive influence could at times break down, resulting in psychiatric symptoms. Repression, then, or what had been known in previous centuries as self-control, was at least as much a part of the problem as it was part of the solution.

Using his system, Freud claimed success in treating “hysteria, phobias and obsessional states, but in malformations of character and in sexual inhibitions or abnormalities [psychoanalysis] can also bring about marked improvements or even recoveries. Its influence upon dementia praecox and paranoia is doubtful; on the other hand, in favourable circumstances it can cope with depressive states, even if they are of a severe type” (Freud 1926).

In Australia, shortly after the First World War, psychoanalysis came to be used to treat soldiers suffering from shell-shock, including by doctors who had themselves served in the trenches (Damousi 32-48). In many cases, the “listening cure” really helped men who had suffered from appalling trauma. Less plausibly but more characteristically Freudian, the Australian analyst Paul Dane, in 1926, concluded that a high proportion of his soldier patients suffered from homosexual repression (Damousi 51). After the Second World War, similarly, psychoanalysis as well as the newer drug treatments were used (Damousi 170).

Alcoholism, of course was another of the problems which Freud attempted to incorporate into his theoretical system. In fact, he addressed it in at least two separate accounts. In *Mourning and Melancholia* (1917), Freud suggested that the alcoholic was fixated in the earliest, the oral stage of psychosexual development. Under this theory, he manifested an “oral personality”, characterised by lack of self-control, passive dependence, self-destructiveness, and gratification
via the mouth. Characteristically, by 1930 Freud had revised his theory of alcoholism. Now he suggested that the alcoholic was repressing homosexual impulses, which manifested as desire for alcohol (Heather and Robertson 74-75).

The lack of basis for Freud’s elaborate system was questioned at the time, as it has continued to be ever since, but debate did not prevent it from having a profound influence, notably in child psychology, psychotherapy in all its manifestations, structural theories of sociology, and pop culture. During the 1920s and 1930s, mass communication via radio brought the theories into the public domain (Damousi 57). As the historian of psychoanalysis in Australia puts it:

“Yet, despite ongoing controversies regarding their veracity, many of the concepts Freud developed relating to trauma, repression, defences, the unconscious, the Oedipus complex, projection and displacement have not only endured but have provided the very framework through which Australians have come to understand their own version of the Western ‘self’ at the juncture of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” (Damousi 2005: 1).

It has to be said, however, that Australian irreverence was also, even at the height of Freudian influence, brought to bear. Will Dyson, the World War One artist and cartoonist, wrote:

“For many years... my health was far from satisfactory. Indeed, I may say without boasting that I was a moving mass of Fixations, Complexes and Obsessions. Indeed, so much so that I was regularly appearing in the novels of Mr D.H. Lawrence. He was
especially interested in my mother complex, which was of a stubborn and annoying character” (in the Melbourne Herald 12 June 1926, quoted in Damousi 104).

In Australia as elsewhere, a raft of theorists arose following the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981, his lifetime covering most of our period). Lacan’s work was less intelligible than Freud’s, being more consciously surrealist and irrational. One of its key themes was “the purification of desire.” What role was there for self-control now? The rise of psychoanalysis was, ultimately, to reduce the extent of the moral in assessing human behaviour, and increase that of the psychiatric and non-rational.

4. FROM MORAL TO SOCIAL

A related field which first emerged in the nineteenth century, and has grown in influence ever since, is sociology. The study of societies and cultures, with their “symbols, rules, norms, and values”, by definition does not identify with any particular set; it purports to be outside, free from the bourgeois assumptions of its subjects, such as their moral beliefs or motivations.

The model was science, which in the second half of the nineteenth century represented such a powerful example. As Émile Durkheim, who, after Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, is seen as the pioneer of the field, put it in his 1895 manifesto:
“What [our principle] demands is that the sociologist put himself in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist, or physiologist when he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific domain” (Durkheim 1964: xlv).

Yet sociology does, of course, have moral beliefs and motivations of its own. The influential textbook *Sociology Australia* (in its third edition, 2007), bluntly lumps together Nazi-era doctors, Australian welfare workers who removed half-caste children between 1900 and 1970, church authorities and their relationship to various forms of child abuse, and the urban planners who put up the housing estates of the 1950s, as follows:

“In each of these cases – and there are many more – we see a failure or inability on the part of apparently well-educated professionals to think through what they were doing. They were either persuaded by delusional beliefs about the problem they thought they were addressing, or they failed to ask very basic ethical or duty-of-care questions before they acted in the ways they did” (Bessant and Watts 4-5).

Bessant and Watts reach this sweeping conclusion without, apparently, feeling any obligation to research the historical phenomena they mention. This appears, without irony, in their section on “thinking critically.”

There is nothing new here. Attempts to create a science of society have, from the start, faced the difficulty of balancing facts with values. Durkheim sought to establish “social facts”, forces which he believed
to operate upon individuals against their wills. (The definition of “fact” as “force” was only the earliest of the violence upon ordinary language which sociology was to exert.)

“[The category of social facts] consists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him” (Durkheim 1964: 3).

The work of Marx has always been avowedly important to the discipline, and its proponents, to varying degrees, have expressed broadly political aims. Max Weber’s marxisant analysis of various aspects of European culture, in the 1890s and early twentieth century, was also quasi-anthropological, and this strand has remained important.

One of the lesser known contributions of the Australian Diggers in World War I was to the history of this anthropological mode of sociology. Durkheim’s nephew and follower Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), serving as an interpreter for the British Army, and himself a decorated soldier, observed the differences between the Australians’ habit of sitting on their haunches during rest periods, and that of Frenchmen like himself, who had to stand up because unable to squat. Mauss went on to publish works on “the technique of the body”, influencing such writers as Foucault (Lechte 1994: 24, 27). Mauss concluded that “an individuality, while not reducible to the social, always has a social expression” (Lechte 1994: 28). In other words, even in this less judgmental and more analytic vein of sociology, individual decisions are considered as not so much individual after all.
Temperance Revisited

From the anthropological or cultural on one hand, we also find a more strongly political tone in such writers as Jürgen Habermas (1929-). Habermas has become one of the best known and celebrated sociologists of the twentieth, and now twenty-first, century. His social theory, critical of capitalism, has claimed that it is important not to equate “the self-regulating system whose imperatives override the consciousness of the members integrated into them” with the “lifeworld”, the world of consciousness and communication (quoted in Lechte 1994: 187, from Habermas’ magnum opus, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 1987, vol. 2, p. 333). The meaning of this appears to be that society is by nature oppressive of normal communication, and that, instead, the aim of communication is emancipation from that oppression.

Aware that study of social norms requires analysis of their basis, Habermas appears to want to have it both ways: to stand outside the system of values, and yet to maintain a moral stance. “What moral theory [italics in original] can do and should be trusted to do is to clarify the universal core of our moral intuitions and thereby refute value skepticism” (quoted in Lechte 1994: 187, from *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, 1990, p. 211). This disturbs his audience: “Although Habermas denies that this means laying claim to any moral truth, it is difficult to see how ‘value skepticism’ can escape a substantive claim about what constitutes a moral issue” (Lechte 1994: 188).16

Subsequent theorists have been reluctant to make open admission of their moral values. The textbook *Sociology Australia* cites the work of George Lakoff, in describing different worldviews as “frames.” These
Temperance Revisited

are, in fact, sets of values. Lakoff describes a conservative moral world-view as

“promoting self-discipline, self-reliance and responsibility...,
• protecting moral people (sic!) from external evils;
• upholding a traditional moral order;
• having conservative values and acting on them; and
• acting to support the moral order” (1995, quoted in Bessant and Watts 36).

The term “moral” or “morality” is used five times in the passage. Lakoff then outlines the features of a progressive worldview:
• “empathetic behaviour and the promotion of fairness;
• Helping people who cannot help themselves;
• Protecting those who cannot help themselves;
• Promoting fulfilment in life; and
• Nurturing and strengthening oneself in order to achieve the above” (1995, quoted in Bessant and Watts 37).

Clearly, the progressive worldview is being presented as better. This passage shows more clearly than most that, while condemning moralism, sociologists betray their own moral perspectives. In this instance, self-control is portrayed as part of a framework which the writers disapprove of, and this impression will inevitably be conveyed to the student reader.
Temperance Revisited

No doubt, however, Lakoff, Bessant and Watts will be found, by some zealous student at some time, to be guilty of some conservative thought-crime or other. A key feature, essentially political, of the progression of trends in sociology, is the discovery that the previous generation had failed to identify some of its own values, and was therefore exposed as reactionary (for instance, the “discovery” of the post-structuralists, such as Derrida, in the 1970s, that the structuralists had failed to censure their own “privileging” of speech over writing: Lechte 1994: 95, 107-108). The remarkable thing is that among writers so given, as part of their mission, to exposing each other’s values, those same values are so readily visible.

Importantly for this paper, this modus operandi – the repeated detection of previously unsuspected thought-crimes such as “values” - has come to influence writing about public health in Australia. This began in the 1960s and 1970s, with some writers (such as Robin Winkler and Una Gault, in 1976) concerned to point out that mental illness was still treated with moral assumptions of “how to behave” in the background (Damousi 263-264). Summarising research developments over the period up to the 1990s, Evan Willis pointed out that the work of Michel Foucault had become increasingly influential. He points out that Foucault’s “view of ill health, as a biological reality but as a social and cultural construction, is being actively debated” (Willis 1991).

5. DECRIMINALISING CRIME: AFTER FOUCALUT
Temperance Revisited

The study of crime, as part of the law, has also, to a large extent, developed along lines which have tended to reduce, trivialise, or dismiss issues of personal responsibility or moral agency, in favour of critical analysis of society. Explaining crimes not in terms of an individual’s will or choices, but as the result of forces (Durkheim’s “social facts”) acting upon him over which he has no control, it regards crime as a construct of those with power in society, who have a political interest in ensuring that people are afraid of crime (see, passim, Kappeler and Potter 2005).

Here, also, the influence of Foucault has been critical. Without going into too much detail, it appears that Foucault’s view of justice was that it is, rather, a system of social surveillance, over time internalised by people. His emphasis in Discipline and Punish (1975) was on the eighteenth-century prison system, not in its role as a more humane alternative to the death penalty, but as the prototype of social control for the centuries to come (Lechte 113-114).

We may assume that Foucault was familiar with the eighteenth-century writers on justice, such as Bentham, of whom he wrote. We should note, however, that a recent study has examined the footnotes to his early work, and found that the picture painted in Foucault’s text of a vast incarceration movement across Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was entirely unsupported by his ostensible sources, or by any other evidence (Scull 2007). But Foucault’s recent followers are not familiar with classical theories of justice or indeed of ethics generally, only with Foucault and his preoccupations, as translated and interpreted. The grasp of history, both social and
Temperance Revisited

intellectual, of such writers is usually at the level of caricature (as amply demonstrated by Bessant and Watts 21-34\textsuperscript{18}).

This means that their teaching about crime reflects little except those preoccupations. Sydney University’s Law School and associated Institute of Criminology boast an impressive staff list. Dr Murray Lee, the Institute’s Director, has published extensively on the phenomenon of fear of crime, including such titles as 	extit{Inventing Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety} (2007). This semester, Dr Lee teaches a postgraduate unit at the Law School called ‘Explaining Crime’, which covers:

- Crime and criminality; crime and the individual; crime and sociological explanations; Marxism and critical criminology; gender and crime; neo-positivism and administrative criminology; the influence of Foucault and theories of governmentality; republicanism and restorative justice; diverse directions in theoretical criminology.\textsuperscript{19}

The only two things you will not find in Dr Lee’s course are, firstly, any suggestion that writers earlier than Marx had anything worthwhile to say about crime or justice, and, secondly, anything about crime being related to individual will and decision-making.

Another aspect of this approach is that it is relativist: that whereas some actions are considered a crime at one time and in one society but not in another (the example always used is homosexuality), there is nothing inherently wrong in the action: it is only determined as wrong by existing norms. See, for instance, “Difference, Deviance and Conformity”, currently taught at Swinburne University of Technology, and “Sociology of Crime and Deviance”, at the University of
Also interesting is the discussion of “Corporate Deviance”, familiar to most of us as fraud, discussed in the book *Public Sociology* (edited by John Germov and Marilyn Poole).

Divested of its moral aspect, crime becomes simply a form of “deviance”: a lifestyle choice which differs from that of the majority (Bessant and Watts, quoting with approval Abe Fatteh [1997]: 414). While this is all very well for homosexuality, it ignores the fact that such acts as murder, rape and theft (and, for that matter, white-collar misdemeanours such as forgery or fraud) have been fairly universally regarded as crimes throughout history.

Related to this theory is the notion (paying tribute to Marx) that crime only occurs because of the contradictions inherent in capitalism. On this view, there is something good about crime, because it is a form of rebellion against society. So, not only has crime been, so to speak, decriminalised, it has been promoted to something admirable. This trend was observable as early as Durkheim himself:

"The authority which the moral conscience enjoys must not be excessive; otherwise, no-one would dare to criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an immutable form. To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself...[even] the originality of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, shall also be possible" (Durkheim 1964: 71).

Importantly, Australian criminal lawyers and police are trained in these theories. A recent publication by the University of New South
Wales, *The Critical Criminology Companion*, by Thalia Anthony and Chris Cunneen (2008), is designed as a textbook for students of law and sociology:

“It traverses a range of debates including the criminalisation of Indigenous people, ethnic communities, the working class, rural communities and young people from critical perspectives, as well as introducing new concepts of state crime. There is coverage of the developments in the penal system that have responded to globalisation and neo-liberalism, particularly in law and order and anti-terror campaigns. This coverage is counterpoised by portrayals of resistance within the penal system and considerations of restorative justice.”

It would take a student with the classical virtue of courage to suggest that crime, often, may have something to do with lack of the classical virtue of self-control, and that that other classical virtue, justice, may exist as a quality, practice, or virtue, independent of the identity of the people holding power in society.

6. JUSTICE AND SELF-CONTROL

This brings us to a brief look at the relationship of justice with self-control. Does justice exist in Australian society? One very popular law textbook, now in its sixth edition (2002), goes out of its way to indicate that, far from embodying justice, Australian laws do no
more than represent and enforce the power and economic systems obtaining in Australian society.

“We have stressed the close relationship between law and society because it is all too easy to think that a legal system necessarily embodies ‘justice’, or is somehow beyond politics. It doesn’t and it isn’t. A legal system that deals fairly between individuals and groups, and between the state and the citizen, is unlikely to be found in a society that is unjust. Law does not come down from the sky, or exist in a vacuum; it is one of our social institutions and reflects the society in which it operates” (Chisholm and Nettheim 2002: 5).

This stance seems confused, and likely to confuse the students it is intended to inform. On the one hand, its use of inverted commas for the word ‘justice’ seems to question the existence of justice, or to admit confusion about its nature. Yet no commas are used for ‘fairly’ or ‘unjust’, which seems, on the other, to admit confidence in the actual existence of such things as fairness and injustice. Further, to note that law is a human, not a divine, institution, should not be to undermine its importance, or even to have any bearing on its relationship to justice: yet that undermining is implied in the last sentence quoted.

Most importantly, perhaps, the tendency of the passage is (even if the existence of justice is admitted) to deny that it is likely to be found in Australian courts, because, it implies, Australian society is unjust. We are left to infer that in a society where everyone had the same
Temperance Revisited

income (or maybe a BMW? Or a harbour view?), justice might possibly be found. It is disturbing to realise that this view is the standard being promoted to law students. In fact, however, the law, as it is developed, does represent what people, usually elected politicians and sometimes unelected judges, think is right, fair and just.

One issue which has had resonance with self-control since the Greeks is the relationship of intoxication to crime. Aristotle praised the institution of the 6th-century BC tyrant Pittacus, that a man convicted of a crime committed while drunk, should pay a double penalty. The issue of how far intoxication should be considered in relation to responsibility for criminal acts has been debated in Australian jurisdictions. The extent to which intoxication affects the intention to commit a crime is part of the issue (Bellanto 2007: 2).

Broadly, legislation enacted in the 1990s in NSW followed UK developments in approaching the matter from the standpoint that if a person was intoxicated by their own act, and committed an offence “of basic intent”, such as assault or manslaughter, the intoxication should not be seen as reducing their responsibility. Intoxication in an offence “of specific intent”, however, which requires an additional purposive element, such as murder, might be considered differently. (It should be noted, however, that the distinction between offences of basic intent and those of specific intent can be vague and arbitrary.) The implications for the importance of self-control are considerable – both in the decision to drink in the first place, and in subsequent decisions which may have been affected by the alcohol.

A further issue occurs in the extent to which a loss of self-control in response to provocation is critical to the difference between, say,
manslaughter and murder. There remain in s23 of the *Crimes Act* 1900 (NSW) the following provisions with regard to provocation as a factor, in trial for murder, which should be considered in relation to whether the accused should, instead, be found guilty of manslaughter.

“(2) (a) [Where] the act or omission is the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the accused that was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused, and

(b) that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased...” (quoted in Bellanto 2007: 9-10).

Whatever the students of sociology and criminology are taught, therefore, there remains in the *Crimes Act* 1900 (NSW) the classical belief that a loss of self-control, including under intoxication and in response to provocation, is critical to the commission of violent crime. It is disturbing to reflect that this may well be the first occasion on which an accused in a NSW courtroom has ever heard of self-control.

Yet more and more people are facing charges for assault. In the period from 1996 to 2007, although homicide decreased by 20 per cent, there was a 55 per cent increase in the number of assaults recorded across Australia. Sexual assault increased by 36 per cent, robbery nearly 10 per cent, and kidnapping by 52 per cent. Adjusting for population increase, assault has still shown a dramatic rise.
Temperance Revisited

Neither in the case of addiction to alcohol or other drugs, or in the case of situations which can lead to violence, can people afford to avoid personal responsibility for controlling their desires and responses. Whatever Australian society may or may not be responsible for, and however just or unjust it may be, individuals still have the power to make choices about addiction or violence. If we are concerned about such matters as the steep rise in assaults, and about the injuries or illness arising from alcohol and drugs, and if we accept that these have something to do with loss of self-control, a new emphasis on that ancient virtue, however unfashionable for a hundred years, is critical.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Temperance Revisited

Self-Control in the Big Scheme of Things

Andrew Mullins

‘Self knowledge leads to self mastery. Self mastery leads to self giving, the foundation for loving relationships.’ So writes David Isaacs in his groundbreaking book *Character Building*, an application of the principles of virtue development to the upbringing of children. He suggests that self mastery, the essential fruit of virtues, *follows upon* clear headed thinking, and *leads to* the fulfilment of lasting relationships of love.

This presentation takes up this insight through an introductory section that focuses on how prudence or sound judgment, described by the ancient Romans as ‘*auriga virtutum*’, the ‘chariot driver of the virtues’, assists the other cardinal virtues. Then I consider the significance of the virtues themselves in the context of the model of the human person offered by rational psychology. In a third section I discuss ways we adults can develop self control and the other virtues, even if, as children we missed out in our upbringing on acquiring the full array of habits of self control.

1. THE THIRD INGREDIENT

Are the decisive factors in the formation of a human character nature and nurture, genes and environment, or is there a third ingredient? Aristotle’s view was that there was indeed a third ingredient. He wrote, ‘*There are three things which make a person good and*
Temperance Revisited

virtuous: one’s natural endowments, one’s habits, and one’s determination to act in accord with what is reasonable and good for a human being. In other words, one’s character is the result of the complex interplay of one’s natural endowments, the habits one has acquired, and one’s free decisions to act in ways seen as most fitting for a human.

John Finnis, Professor of Natural Law at Oxford, reaches a similar conclusion from a different direction. In his text *Natural Law and Natural Rights* there is a beautiful discussion about the goods required for human flourishing. He lists these as:

- Life
- Knowledge
- Play
- Aesthetic experience
- Sociability
- Practical reasonableness
- Religion.

He describes practical reasonableness as: ‘Bringing one’s own intelligence to bear effectively on the problems of choosing one’s actions and life-style and shaping one’s own character.’ He is saying that, if we are to flourish as human beings, if we are to fulfill our potential, we must act rationally. We must apply our rationality to make practical judgements about the worthiness of our actions. This seems very close to the idea of conscience. Stephen Covey describes conscience as ‘one of the four great gifts of human nature, along with self-awareness, an independent will, and imagination. All four are needed.’ Vlad the Impaler had not shortage of self awareness, independence, and by all accounts imagination, but he
Temperance Revisited

lacked this crucial ingredient for moral and human maturity, conscience.

To the ancients, this capacity to distinguish between right and wrong was the very benchmark of having reached adulthood. Twice in the *Odyssey*, Homer has Telemachus proclaim to his mother as he beseeches her permission to sail off in search of his father, *I know the difference between right and wrong I am no longer a child*. In Aristotelian terms right behaviour is behaviour that accords with our nature and so will lead us to happiness.

Christianity takes one further, most beautiful, step illustrated by the dialogue that ensues when the 12 year old Jesus, lost in Jerusalem for three days is found by his parents. His mother asks him, *Why have you treated us so? Your father and I have been looking for you anxiously.* In other words, she, the perfect mother is giving us a model for the way that we can engage with adolescents, assisting them in the formation of their conscience. She asks her son to reflect on why he has acted the way he has. In specific she is asking him to consider the impact his actions have had on those who love him. This dialogue illustrates the difference between the classical and the Christian vision of virtue. Classically, the actions of a virtue are carried out for their own sake: one is courageous because it is good to be courageous; it is most fitting with human nature to be courageous. However the teachings of Christianity transcend this motivation. St Paul and Augustine teach that the only worthwhile motivation for virtue is love for others. Paul teaches, *Order your lives in charity.* Augustine says, *All virtue is love.* Along this line the Canadian philosopher Donald De Marco writes, *It is through virtues we deliver love to others.*
**Temperance Revisited**

We conclude that we must, as adults, strive to motivate our lives by a conscience determined to deliver love to others, first of all those to whom we are closest by ties of family and friendship. A family, where the parents model mutual self giving, and all contribute to the common good according to their age and ability, is the ideal society for building this vision of human flourishing. This accords with a vision of human nature as essentially relational.

2. **RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 1A**

In this section, I discuss the model that rational psychology proposes for human person and then focus on the role of virtues in that model and on contemporary confirmations of this classical model.

In the first diagram below, I seek to illustrate, albeit in a simplified manner, the relationship between the material and spiritual faculties of man, represented by the intersecting circles, their respective faculties (*intellect* and *will* in the spiritual dimension, and *senses, emotions* and *passions* in the material). I place will in the area of intersection of the circles to demonstrate that it is through our wills that we act in the material world. The horizontal arrows illustrate the fortifying action on the intellect of the intellectual virtue of prudence, and on the will of the three moral virtues. The arrow ascending from the senses represents sense information, informed by emotions and passions, carried through to the higher faculties. The bold descending arrow represents the executive command of the intellect to the will for action.
Virtues empower us to manage our emotions and better manage ourselves.

Diagram 1.

In this second diagram, the bold arrow represents a short circuiting of executive direction. The emotions and passions as it were highjack the directive capacity of the intellect. The smaller horizontal arrows represent the ineffective function of the virtues, which ought to be powers of self management but which in this case are unable to assist effectively the will and intellect. It is important to understand that emotions and passions are neither good nor bad in themselves. They empower us to empathise and to interact, and they connect the life of the senses and the life of the mind.
Sometimes our actions are driven more by our feelings. Intellect is assisted by a habit of sound judgement (logical reasoning based on sound convictions). The will is helped by habits of responsibility, self-control and courage, habits of effective management of the body’s passionate and emotional responses.

The higher, spiritual sphere of human activity: intellect and will. The material sphere of human activity: including senses, passions, emotions.

Diagram 2.

It is important to remember that virtues are good habits. Aristotle says ‘Happiness is the reward of virtue’\textsuperscript{10}. He does not say ‘Happiness is the reward of values’. Elsewhere he writes, ‘It makes no small difference whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.’\textsuperscript{11} Along a similar thoughtline, he writes ‘Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit’\textsuperscript{12}. Our habits change us.

What is the link between character and habit? What we do reveals our character, especially what we do habitually. Character is essentially the sum of our habits. Batman ruminates, in a recent remake, ‘Our actions determine our worth.’ Goethe proclaims ‘Character is simply strongly established habit.’ Thomas Lickona, perhaps the most important name in the contemporary character education movement in the USA insists,
Temperance Revisited

‘Good character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good, and doing the good... habits of mind, habits of heart, and habits of action.’ Remember: virtues are all about self management. Courage, for example, does not give us the wherewithal to punch the bully, it gives us the established habit of managing our fear. ‘The impulses of an incontinent man carry him in the opposite direction from that towards which he was aiming’ writes Aristotle, understanding that virtues are powers for management of our emotional lives.

As discussed in Part 1 of this paper, it is clear that we must aim in the right direction; we must distinguish between right and wrong and elect to do good; we must have a loving intention. Established habitual behaviours enable us to turn that motivating desire into effective action. Peter Kreeft writes, ‘(Virtues) are relevant to man in every age because they are relevant to man himself, not to the age. They fit our nature and nature’s needs.’ This vision of virtue development is not just one more theory about how human beings mature.

Some reflection on the cardinal virtues is appropriate here. The cardinal virtues cover each one of the bases. Joseph Pieper calls them ‘one of the great discoveries in the history of man’s self-understanding.’ The cardinal virtues span the four major spheres of action in our lives: Prudence (sound judgement) and Temperance (self control), the internally directed virtues, give us the necessary strengths to govern our mind and our passions; Justice (respect and responsibility) and Fortitude (courage), the externally directed virtues, give us the strengths to live up to our duties towards others, and to overcome external obstacles.

Habits are acquired by repetition of behaviours. Parents can make this easier for a young child through home timetables, clear expectations, accountability, follow-up, feedback, ‘family culture’, and
Temperance Revisited

consistent messages from both mum and dad, and from home and school. Clear models of behaviour help us. Routines and timetables are the stuff of habits; habits are the stuff of virtue, provided there is a loving motivation, along with personal conviction and freedom.

In recent years it has also become clear that the neuroscience is validating Aristotle\textsuperscript{16}. Our behaviours do change us... even anatomically. Our brains wire according to experience and environment, and according to habitual behaviours. Neuroscience is now identifying several of the core mechanisms for the development of character\textsuperscript{17}. Within the last two decades, scientists have identified the neurophysiological mechanisms for imitation and habit formation, two major areas for a better understanding of the building blocks of character. The implications of these discoveries are momentous. Without detracting from the underpinning rationality that provides good intention to our actions, the neuroscience is reminding us how our minds work: established neural pathways become easy shortcuts to action; mechanisms for plasticity explain the ease with which we absorb example, and consolidate behaviours; first experiences can be virtually indelible; focused attention and emotional engagement facilitate learning, anatomical changes, in the brain. For several decades discussion of habits and virtues has been marginalized in the discussion of character. The neuroscience is demanding that we reassess.

These developments urge parents and adults to be diligently attentive to the inputs they allow to enter the lives of their own impressionable children, and also their own minds. John Ratey, a Harvard neuroscientist, puts it chillingly, “The brain’s structure becomes the information it receives.”\textsuperscript{18} If this is true for advertisements about food, it
Temperance Revisited

will also be true for the desensitizing effects of exposure to violent or sexualized content.

These discoveries help to explain the development of preferred neuronal pathways for established stable behaviours. We now know that frequently used neuronal circuits are reinforced, consolidated, and made permanent through ongoing processes of synaptic strengthening and myelination. Recurring behaviours are essentially ‘hardwired’. Every great-grandmother could tell us that habits are established by repetition but now we know that repeated behaviours actually consolidate the neuronal pathways, creating shortcuts for specific actions, for better or for worse. The how of virtues and vices, is now essentially described.

It is also significant to note that two of the biggest names in modern psychology are focusing their work on the development of virtues. Martin Seligman and Christopher Peterson have produced a major work entitled Character Strengths and Virtues published by Oxford University Press in 2004 which is an analytical framework for discussion of character which they define as a composite of positive traits or habits. Seligman is a past President of the American Psychological Association and professor of psychology at University of Pennsylvania. His fame was established by his groundbreaking work on resilience for young people. Peterson is professor of psychology at the University of Michigan.

Their work aligns with and thereby validates the Aristotelian vision of character, of the human person brought to maturity by virtues understood as good habits. Their avowed aim is to ‘reclaim the study of character and virtue as legitimate topics of psychological inquiry and societal discourse’. They state, ‘We believe good character can be cultivated, but to do so we need conceptual and empirical tools to craft and evaluate interventions.’ Seligman
Temperance Revisited

and Peterson share Aristotle’s ambition. They write, ‘This handbook focuses on … the strengths of character that make the good life possible.’

Seligman and Peterson through an exhaustive process identify six umbrella abstract virtues: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance, humanity and transcendence and a further list of character strengths subordinate to the virtues. It is no coincidence that their list of virtues bears resemblance to core virtues of the various traditions of man. For example the four cardinal virtues of prudence (sound judgement), justice, temperance, and fortitude align closely with the six of Seligman and Peterson. Possibly the Greeks would have rolled wisdom, humanity and transcendence into prudence.

Under the six virtue headings the authors drill down to twenty four character strengths, or stable traits of character; for example wisdom is the umbrella virtue for creativity, curiosity, open-mindedness, love of learning, and perspective. The authors suggest that one can further descend to what they call ‘situational themes’, habits manifesting the character strengths in specific circumstances. The whole process is thus from the abstract to the specific habits that manifest the virtues. In so doing, they elevate discussion of virtues to a clinical basis through an evidence-based methodology.

3. TEN STEPS TO GET IN THE BACK DOOR

In the previous two sections of this talk I have sought to establish the necessity of virtues for self directed happiness in life. This third and last section of today’s talk proposes ten strategies that can help us as adults to develop virtues. It will be seen that a deep sense of right and wrong, and a keen awareness of how our actions impact on others
Temperance Revisited

can be powerful motivations for building self control in adults. Our work in support of parents and in teaching parenting skills\textsuperscript{21} shows time and again that the desire to support one’s spouse, and to give the best example one can to one’s child, can be driving forces in the acquisition of greater self control.

How can we change our habits? This is a question that has enthralled thinkers of every generation. For example there are time-honoured ways of facilitating change: the 40 days of Lent and the time of Ramadan. We can take advantage of crises, such as unemployment, pregnancy, and bereavement to change our lives… with or without us these events can be absolutely life changing. We can use what we could call the ‘tattoo principle’, keeping one’s loved one’s present by means of physical reminders as an aid to keeping them in our heart and in our loyal behaviours. Some even try the Anthony Robbins approach of minimum sleep, maximum sense input. It is clear that an adult is best served by facing the facts, naming the behavior he or she wants to change, formulating resolutions, showing constancy, and giving focused attention to the task.

i. Lessons from an F18 Debriefing

One of Australia’s most experienced F18 pilots spoke to the senior students of my school. He told us that in the debrief after missions pilots stick to the protocol of providing facts without emotion and without justifying their actions. We too need the intellectual sincerity and humility to face facts. ‘\textit{Know thyself}’ was inscribed over the cave of the Oracle of Delphi. I need to face the way I have made myself. I need to name the triggers for my behaviours… the predisposing contexts that lead to repetitions of the behaviour I want to root out.
ii. **Settle in for the long haul.**

Habits can be as if set in concrete. Aristotle said that the development of virtue is arduous. It is so important that we build up new behaviours with constancy. Repeated behaviours build habits. Therefore we need specific, realistic goal setting, honest evaluation, and determined followup. Focused determination that changes us. The chief obstacle to character development is attachment to our current behaviours. And we must bear in mind the theological dictum, that grace builds on nature. We need a foundation of natural moral virtues if we wish to build up habits in the spiritual life.

iii. **We need models.**

Virtue needs exemplars to model itself on…. friends, mentors, figures in literature and from faith. Parents are the natural models for their own children. We too naturally imitate those who take an interest in us, or with whom we choose to spend time. Therefore we must strive to associate with better people than ourselves, and to draw inspiration from great works of others.

iv. **Our lives must focus on doing good for others.**

It’s all too easy to slip into self absorption. Mr D’Arcy proclaims in Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*, ‘I have been a selfish being all my life, in practice though not in principle.’ This is a trap for all of us. The intemperate person is self absorbed, touchy, greedy, selfish, self justifying. We must break the cycle by serving others.

v. **Make commitments.**

Good causes are not optional extras. Ideals are the antidote to materialism. I need to get my hands dirty in the service of others, harnessing all the initiative and generosity I can muster. Idealism can drive behaviour. Through commitments we hold ourselves to
Temperance Revisited

behaviours. Commitments in marriage hold relationships together in difficult times. Business contracts hold partnerships together in downtimes. Commitments to mowing an elderly neighbour’s lawn help us to become more generous.

vi. **We become like the company we keep.**

Our peer group changes us. Our cyber world changes us. I must attach myself to the best mentors I can find... professionally and humanly.

vii. **Sex is meant to be habit forming.**

Our body chemistry ensures that sexual relationships initiate a profound *bonding* process... that can assist us when we enter the relationship we intend to be permanent, or it can drastically hinder our fulfilment when we engage in impulsive sexual behaviours. Dr Janet Smith, philosopher from University of Dallas, insists, ‘*Sex is all about babies and bonding.*’ We live a lie if our bodies engage without a corresponding lifelong commitment. Sexual addictions can complicate the issue: the mechanisms are now being described whereby pornography ‘changes’ our brains... making it much harder afterwards to reverse the habit. Sadly too, we can so easily justify our behaviours, failing to admit to ourselves the precursor behaviours that trigger undesirable behaviours. Also we can fail to admit certain realities about human psychology: that emotions, passions, and attachments are meant to ‘turn on’ with frequent meeting, with physical contact or with one-on-one situations. Without facing the predisposing behaviours we will not change the resulting habits.

viii. **200 square centimetres**

It can help to consider that each way of behaving is actually made up of small details of behaviour. So, for example, if we wish to develop
Temperance Revisited

a more optimistic approach to difficulties, it can help to focus on maintaining a positive and receptive expression on our faces. This is particularly true for parents who must take responsibility for the atmosphere in their homes. How we manage the 200cm$^2$ of area of our faces determines the attention we give to others, and the peace in our own lives and homes. It is interesting that even Nietzsche realized this, ‘If Christians were more joyous, they would certainly be more convincing.’ The children’s court magistrate Barbara Holborrow says, *Why should children be happy with their lot, when parents complain about theirs.* \(^22\) We must model the resilience we hope to build in the lives of the young people in our care. In the process we too will be happier.

ix. **Hope**

It is Bill Gates who says, *We overestimate change in the next two years, and totally underestimate change over the next 10 years.* We can apply this to our own efforts to remake our characters. Little by little the effort pays off. Constancy is everything.

x. **The fruit of self mastery**

And so we return to Professor David Isaacs’ insight, ‘*Self knowledge leads to self mastery. Self mastery leads to self giving, the foundation for loving relationships.*’ Note the sequence: the starting point for the self mastery that empowers us to give our lives in fulfilling relationships is self knowledge. Without sincerity, and without an openness to truth, to discernment between right and wrong, and to our duties towards our fellow man, it can be very difficult to achieve self mastery. Without the self mastery offered us in the virtuous life, we will seek in vain for fulfilment in love. The words of John Paul II carry a timeless truth:

> *Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to*
4. CONCLUSION

Today we have been looking at the way that virtues empower us to manage our emotional lives. We have seen that reason plays a major role in the exercise of virtue, through the guidance that prudence offers the virtues and also by providing us with the best motivation for human action— to do good, understood as to do that which befits and gladdens human nature. We have considered a key aspect of this task of doing good is to underpin all our actions with a loving intention because man is fulfilled in relationships.

Finally we have considered that, as adults, we get a second opportunity to acquire virtue: children have the benefit of acquiring virtuous behaviours if they have enjoyed a careful upbringing, but we adults can come in the back door, as it were, by being honest about our deficiencies, naming the behaviours we wish to change, setting ourselves goals and working with constancy at building up new habitual behaviours.
Obesity, anorexia and mental illness insidiously pave the terrain of so many lives today, while addictions to drugs, sex and alcohol leave nothing but destruction and despair in their paths. We see this in the young girl who starves herself into further insecurity. We read new statistics daily, as the rising demand for anti-depressant drugs reaches new heights. We hear distressingly familiar stories of drugs devastating lives and families, and the soaring rates of youth suicide. Yet amidst this painful confusion there are also those who perpetually struggle against temptation, those who do not fall victim to the lure of pleasure. In a society saturated by images and rhetoric geared towards gratifying our every desire, why, and how, do some say no?

Philosophers Aristotle and Aquinas would undoubtedly attribute the current state of Western society to the rejection of virtue, and in particular, the virtue of temperance. Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue* contends that it is Aristotle’s conception of virtue that ‘decisively constitutes the classical tradition as a tradition of moral thought.’¹ In the paper *Virtues and Vices* Philippa Foot agrees, positing that it is ‘in the blending of Aristotelian and Christian philosophy found in St Thomas’ that provides the most comprehensive account of virtues and vices.² It is therefore apposite to
examine virtues and vices within the context of Aristotelian and Thomistic thought. These great thinkers would suggest that, having cast off the shackles of traditional conceptions of virtue, contemporary society has failed to replace it with a worthy substitute. Rather, we have accepted an ‘emasculated’ and ‘impoverished,’ conception of virtue.\(^3\) Where Aristotle and Aquinas place the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance on the highest pedestal, current society deems as the most virtuous those who are environmentally aware and as the least virtuous those who smoke in public.\(^4\) Where Aristotle and Aquinas see virtue as necessary for harmony and happiness in life, current thought sees it – at best – as optional and rather quaint.

Aristotle and Aquinas would further attribute today’s problems to the failure to appreciate the link between virtue and the *polis*, that is, the political community in which we live. For them, societal flourishing is dependent on individual flourishing. When the order and harmony associated with virtue has been rejected by individuals it becomes impossible to expect order and harmony to reign within the individual or the society that inhabit.

Mentioning the word ‘virtue’ today in many social contexts is a guaranteed way to kill a conversation. Frustration rises in our throats as we prepare to hear yet another great-aunt pontificate about the evils of the world today. But surely this isn’t the kind of virtue that Aristotle professed to his pupils at the Lyceum? Classical philosopher Julia Annas recognises this phenomenon in *The Morality of Happiness* where she acknowledges that discussions of virtue ‘may seem initially uncompelling to us, given that talk of virtue tends to sound artificial or archaic.’\(^5\) However, Annas reminds us that ‘it is important to realize that we share the concern here if not the way of talking about it.’\(^6\) Just because we do not talk about virtue in quite the
same way as the ancients, does not mean that our interest in it is any less keen. And it certainly does not mean that we should accept any impoverished conceptions of virtue offered to replace those of the ancients and scholastics.

In her influential paper entitled *Moral Saints* Susan Wolf provides us with an accurate, though perhaps more extreme, representation of current popular conceptions of virtue.\(^7\) Wolf argues that it is irrational to pursue virtue because by doing so an individual ignores the ‘non-moral virtues’ that enrich life and make it worth living.\(^8\) Moral saints, or virtuous individuals, according to Wolf, will be repressed as well as ‘dull-witted or humourless or bland.’\(^9\) In their constant pursuit of virtue, and in particular the virtue of temperance, they will be unable to cultivate such non-moral virtues as a sarcastic sense of humour, gourmet cooking, fine literature, music, fashion, interior design or sports. As a result, their temperance will render them inhuman individuals without personality or an attractive character. Furthermore, it is not only unpleasant for the moral saints to be virtuous, but it is also unpleasant for those around them due to their ‘holier then thou’ attitude which makes them ‘nauseating companion[s]’ who ‘inhibit others’ ability to enjoy themselves.’\(^10\)

Despite having painted such a repellent portrait, Wolf makes some surprising clarifications. First, Wolf claims that she does not mean to deny that moral saints are noble or admirable. Nor it is her intention, she claims, to condemn moral saints and moral aspirations. On the contrary, Wolf asserts that the virtuous individual must be unusually nice, ‘patient, considerate, even-tempered, hospitable, charitable in thought as well as in deed’ as well as not being judgemental, offensive, prejudiced or biased.\(^11\) The reader is left with two apparently irreconcilable images: one of the
worst dinner guest ever, and the other of a perfect role model and ideal citizen, neither of which Wolf accepts as truly virtuous.

What kind of image of the virtuous person, then, would Wolf offer as preferable to these? Wolf offers the following examples: Katharine Hepburn, Paul Newman and Natasha Rostov. These individuals are preferred respectively for their non-moral virtues of ‘grace … cool … [and] high-spirited passionate nature.’ These certainly seem to be attractive and desirable qualities, and the reader wonders who exactly Wolf is arguing against; who could possibly prefer the nauseating do-gooder to the above individuals? If it was not clear before this that Wolf is rejecting what she believes to be the Christian conception of virtue, the suggestion that the moral saint may eschew pleasure and non-moral virtues because of ‘a pathological fear of damnation’ surely clarifies the matter. The question, therefore, is whether or not this is an accurate understanding of the Christian conception of virtue, and therefore also the Aristotelian conception upon which it is founded.

Do the Christian and Aristotelian conceptions of virtue profess that you cannot have both the virtues and appreciate life’s pleasures? Do the morally virtuous find it easier to reject the non-moral virtues because they do not actually have the capacity to appreciate them? Or are the virtuous so worried about being damned if they were to engage in pleasurable pursuits that they reject them in their entirety? And does the possession of virtue necessarily exclude the possession of a personality and a sense of humour?

The virtue concerned with pleasure is, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, the virtue of temperance. In order to define a virtue Aristotle developed, and Aquinas accepted, the doctrine of the mean whereby a virtue lies between two extremes. According to this doctrine, the virtue of
Temperance Revisited

courage, which generally concerns fear in the face of danger, lies between the excessive bravado of recklessness, and the lack of bravery in the deficiency of cowardice. Similarly, the virtue of temperance can be seen to lie between the excessive pursuit of pleasure called licentiousness and the deficient appreciation of pleasure called insensitivity or unfeelingness.\(^{15}\) The use of the term ‘insensitivity’ for the deficiency of temperance initially strikes the reader as odd, as temperance is generally associated with the amount of food or drink consumed. However, it is not the amount of food consumed, or even the pleasure aroused in the individual by the food consumption, but rather the value which the individual places on the food consumption which, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, is of prime importance to understanding the virtue of temperance.\(^{16}\)

So when Wolf wonders whether the temperate individual finds it so easy to reject pleasure because he or she lacks the capacity to appreciate it, it is clear that she has misunderstood the Aristotelian and Christian conceptions of virtue. First, if an individual finds it easy to reject pleasure, because of a natural disposition to do so for example, then he is not genuinely virtuous. To qualify as genuinely virtuous, Aristotle teaches that an individual must have habitually struggled against temptation in the past, and have reached the stage where he no longer has to struggle. Past struggle is necessary for present virtue. If an individual never had to struggle to achieve virtue, he cannot be said to be virtuous. Second, people who do not have the capacity to appreciate pleasure are by no means virtuous on the Aristotelian and Thomistic definition. They are, on the contrary, lacking in virtue through their insensitivity to pleasure, which is a natural and healthy part of human life.\(^{17}\) While genuine temperance is guided by reason, insensibility in the guise of temperance is based on the
belief that pleasures are in themselves bad, a position that both Aristotle and Aquinas reject.

Having manifestly misunderstood the relationship between virtue and pleasure, was Wolf correct in her assertion that the moral saint will be ‘dull-witted or humourless or bland?’ Both Aristotle and Aquinas reply unmistakably in the negative. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle contends:

As for pleasantness in social entertainment, the intermediate [that is, temperate] man is witty, and the disposition wit; the excess is buffoonery and the indulger in it a buffoon; the man who is deficient is a kind of boor and his disposition boorish.’

Aquinas similarly rejects the equation of virtue with the lack of personality or humour:

Anything conflicting with reason in human actions is vicious. It is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by never showing himself agreeable to others or being a kill-joy or wet blanket on their enjoyment. And so Seneca says, *Bear yourself with wit, lest you be regarded as sour or despised as dull.* Now those who lack playfulness are sinful, those who never say anything to make you smile, or are grumpy with those who do. Aristotle speaks of them as rough and boorish.

Thus, virtue can be seen to exist alongside a sense of humour and a personality in the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas.

It is therefore strikingly apparent that Wolf has mistakenly identified her opponent as Christian philosophy. The question then arises: would Wolf, on her account, genuinely prefer a Katharine Hepburn to a Mother
Temperance Revisited

Teresa? Or could it be that Wolf is attempting to offer a more balanced understanding of the virtues by arguing not that the virtues should be avoided at all costs, but rather that they should be sought in conjunction with the non-moral virtues? The answer is no. Wolf does not believe that virtues and non-moral virtues can be sought together. The desire to be moral, she argues, drowns out the desire for the non-moral virtues due to its ‘peculiar psychological strength.’

So then the choice is either moral virtue, or non-moral virtue, but not both. It seems, then, that Wolf would genuinely prefer Hepburn to Mother Teresa. But in what context? No doubt Mother Teresa’s backhand wasn’t quite what it could have been but would Wolf really prefer her to Hepburn? At a dinner-party the answer would probably be yes. But what about as a mother, teacher, leader, doctor, or carer? And what if Wolf’s privileged membership in Western society were taken from her, and she was homeless on the streets of India, would she then reconsider her preference?

In his book *A Common Humanity* Australian philosopher Raimond Gaita offers an insightful and moving reflection on virtue and moral saints. He tells of his experience as a young man working in a psychiatric hospital where the patients were abandoned by their families to the frequently cruel treatment of the psychiatrists and nurses. Gaita recalls that only a few doctors recognised the dignity of the patients and treated them with the respect this dignity demands. However, it was not until a nun paid the patients a visit that Gaita discovered what it really means to love and respect those who we find most difficult to love. It was through the nun’s treatment of the patients that she ‘revealed that even such patients were, as the psychiatrists and I have sincerely and generously professed, the equals of those who wanted to help them; but she also revealed that in our hearts we did not believe this.’ It was her love for the patients, and the way this
Temperance Revisited

was manifested in her behaviour, that differentiated the nun from the psychiatrists. Perhaps, as Gaita suggests, it is only through the love of saints that the humanity of these people, who popular opinion would deem better off not born at all, becomes visible.23

II

In her paper Moral Beliefs Philippa Foot attributes misconceptions of virtue, such as Wolf’s, to the mistaken identification of speciously virtuous individuals with genuinely virtuous individuals. Foot suggests that ‘those who question the virtue of temperance are probably thinking not of the virtue itself but of men whose temperance has consisted in resisting pleasure for the sake of some illusory good, or those who have made this virtue their pride.’24 An equally significant cause of popular misconceptions is the imprecise translation of Aristotle’s sophrosune and Aquinas’ temperantia, which have been conventionally, but not quite satisfactorily, translated as temperance. This poor translation has led to the widespread notion that temperance is philosophically synonymous to both moderation and self-control. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, however, moderation and self-control are necessary, but not sufficient, parts of temperance. Where moderation is associated with asceticism and unnatural suppression, temperance is associated with reason, harmony and human flourishing. While moderation generally concerns only the physical, temperance concerns both the physical and spiritual elements of the human person.

Nor is self-control, or continence, identical to temperance. For Aristotle, continence and incontinence do not yet qualify as virtue and vice respectively.25 In order to do so they would have to be so deeply ingrained
in the individual’s character to have become habitual. On this account, if
an incontinent person were to perform a virtuous act, you could not
technically call him virtuous, as he had to overcome his emotions and
appetites in order to perform the virtuous act. Nor would an incontinent
person who performed vicious acts be properly called vicious. Unless we
experience no inner conflict, are in complete control of our appetites, are
‘unified in motivation and deliberation’ and perform virtuous and vicious
acts almost without thought, we cannot be rightly called either virtuous or
vicious. For example, most people would prefer not to feel tempted to
download child pornography off the Internet. And if they had to choose
between struggling against such a temptation, and no longer having to do
so due to repeated victories, most people would choose the latter option.
In this way, temperance is seen to be preferable to continence.

It is therefore clear that Aristotle and Aquinas do not reject food,
alcohol and sex as intrinsically bad and beneath us as rational and spiritual
beings. Rather they invite us to appreciate the goodness of these pleasures
rationally and moderately. Virtue is not oppressive but liberating in that it
is necessary not only for the health of body and mind, but also for
eudaimonia, that is, happiness or human flourishing. In fact, Aquinas makes
the initially paradoxical contention that it is only through temperance that
pleasures can be truly appreciated.

To make sense out of this paradox, it is necessary to examine the most
common forms of intemperance that can be found in the areas of food,
alcohol and sex. Aristotle looks at the intemperance of the ‘belly-mad’
glutton and the ‘gourmet [who] prayed that his throat might become
longer than a crane’s.’ In *Aristotle on Temperance* Charles Young notes that
Aristotle focuses mainly on intemperance with food, not paying significant
attention to intemperance with alcohol and sex. Temperance for
Temperance Revisited

Aristotle, Young explains, is strongly connected with physical needs, and he does not believe that we physically need alcohol or sex.  

Aquinas focuses on intemperance in alcohol and sex with greater depth. He additionally broadens the discussion to the various ways in which gluttony is manifest: in regard to the price, the quality, the fanciness, the quantity, as well as the appropriateness of the timing and manners with which food and alcohol are consumed.  

The intemperate man has a lust for pleasure that is ‘unregulated by reason.’ The more he becomes a slave to his desire for pleasure, the greater the distance between him and reason. According to Aquinas the consequences become more severe when intemperance with alcohol is considered, as alcohol has the capacity to both weaken the control of reason and severely disturb the inner-order.

The form of intemperance that has the greatest capacity to disturb the inner order, however, is sexual intemperance, which is found not only in the excess but also in the deficiency. Aquinas rejects the puritanical understanding of sex as intrinsically bad, but a necessary evil, as both defective and heretical, arguing to the contrary that sex is actually a good.

It is by way of the link between physical and mental sexual intemperance that Aquinas’ introduction of intemperance with regards to knowledge can be most clearly grasped. While Aristotle argues that such things as learning or ‘objects of sight, like colours and shapes and pictures,’ do not lie within the jurisdiction of temperance, Aquinas introduces the distinction between studiositas and curiositas, that is, temperance and intemperance in regards to knowledge. He defends his position arguing that ‘spiritual pleasures are stronger than bodily pleasures,’ and are therefore more significantly within the concern of temperance.
Temperance Revisited

Intemperance in the area of knowledge, where bodily and mental intemperance coincide, can be clearly viewed in today’s multi-billion dollar pornography industry. This form of intemperance extends to the inordinate desire for knowledge of experiences, both sexual and otherwise. In this way it concerns risky behaviours prevalent among teenagers and young adults today, such as drug-taking and aberrant sexual practices, through which new and ever more pleasurable experiences are sought. This constant need to intensify pleasure engenders spiritual restlessness, which in turn leads to a spirit of despair by obscuring reality and replacing it with an illusion. Pieper paints a disturbingly familiar picture of such a world:

… it surrounds itself with the restlessness of a perpetual moving picture of meaningless shows, and with the literally deafening noise of impressions and sensations breathlessly rushing past the windows of the senses. Behind the flimsy pomp of its façade dwells absolute nothingness.

It is through the pursuit of temperance in knowledge that the individual seeks to protect him or herself from being seduced by an illusion and falling victim to despair.

It is the undermining of the control of reason, and the corruption of the virtue of prudence that, for Aristotle and Aquinas, are the most severe consequences of intemperance. Temperance is necessary for the preservation of reason, which maintains harmony in the inner-order. Intemperance clouds reason and produces an illusory feeling of joy that ultimately leaves the individual empty and unsatisfied. Aristotle and Aquinas understand prudence to be the virtue that guides the individual’s
Temperance Revisited

moral decision-making process, and thereby links the individual to reality. By dethroning reason and corrupting prudence, intemperance becomes an obstacle between the individual and an accurate grasp of reality. This is particularly the case with sexual intemperance where the intensity of the individual’s desire drowns out reality, as the individual’s point of reference is no longer reality but himself. Sexual temperance is necessary for the reinstallation of reason as the governor of the passions and for a detached view of reality that makes knowledge possible.

The assertion that temperance enhances pleasure can therefore be seen to be not as paradoxical or as counter-intuitive as first thought. With temperance, the hold of pleasure over the individual is weakened, and the individual is given the choice to seek, or to refrain, from pleasure. The very possibility of choice, serves to enhance pleasure. Aquinas sees temperance as crucial to the genuine appreciation of the sensual, as the sexually intemperate limit the sensual world to the sexual, ignoring the depth and range of the sensual by reducing it to a ‘self-centred will to pleasure.’ With temperance preserving both reason and prudence the individual is able to grasp reality more accurately, and to appreciate the value of food, drink and sex to the right degree, not overestimating their value, which inevitably leads to discontent.

As the intemperate person seeks the right thing the wrong way, and therefore never achieves his goal, it is inevitable that he will become discontent. Deliberately setting out on a misguided path is akin to choosing not to achieve what you desperately want, and engenders despair through constant failure. Such despair can be seen in the current epidemic of mental illnesses throughout the world. Mental disorders are, posits Pieper, almost always linked to intemperance as ‘witnesses to a disturbed inner order.’ It must be noted, however, that intemperance is not only
symptomatic of mental illness, but also a significant cause of it. Nowhere is this more visible than in the frequency of suicide today, particularly among the young and most vulnerable members of our society; suicide being the ultimate act of despair.

Aristotle and Aquinas have painted a vivid picture of the intemperate person. Through the dethroning of reason, he has evicted harmony and balance from within himself. By his habitual submission to the temptations of pleasure, his will has become weak, so even if he wanted to do the right thing, he does not have the strength to do so. In this way the virtue of prudence has been corrupted, confusing him as to what exactly is the right thing to do to achieve a given end. The failure to see the correct means to achieve this end, results in the failure to achieve that end, which in turns leads to despair. MacIntyre describes such a person in the following way: ‘On the one hand one would lack any means of ordering one’s emotions and desires, of deciding rationally which to cultivate and encourage, which to inhibit and reduce; on the other hand on particular occasions one would lack those dispositions which enable a desire for something other than that is actually one’s good to be held in check.’

The vicious individual has made himself a victim of his own desires; he has opened himself up to despair, and ruined his own chances at securing happiness.

It is manifestly clear that something is drastically wrong within society. The question is, would society be better off embracing the rich and embodied conception of virtue offered by Aristotle and Aquinas, or resigning itself to the cynicism in popular conceptions of virtue, such as that offered by Wolf? MacIntyre contends that the reason we should choose the former is because of the intimate link between virtue and the polis, which is most clearly appreciated by the ancient Greeks. For Socrates, Plato and Aristotle virtue was structured and defined by the polis; the
Temperance Revisited

concept of a virtuous hermit made absolutely no sense to them. Virtue could only be realised within the context of a political community. MacIntyre explains that ‘the harmony of individual character is reproduced in the harmony of the state.’ Foot similarly sees the benefit of virtue as extending from the individual to society, positing that, ‘Courage, temperance and wisdom benefit both the person who has these dispositions and other people as well.’

Nobody has recognised the incongruence of popular conceptions of virtue with those of the ancients more profoundly than Simone Weil. Weil would undoubtedly reject Wolf’s fictional account of the nauseating do-gooder, who, as we have seen, does not qualify as virtuous on the accounts of either Aristotle or Aquinas. Weil would applaud Gaita’s introduction of the non-fictional into his reflection on human virtue by way of the nun visiting the mental hospital. In a concise defence of traditional conceptions of virtue, Weil posits that: ‘Imaginary evil is romantic and varied; real evil is gloomy, monotonous, barren, boring. Imaginary good is boring; real good is always new, marvellous, intoxicating.’

Aristotle and Aquinas’ understanding of virtue is ultimately concerned with the acquisition of peace, harmony and rationality within the individual and society, achieved through the cultivation of the virtue of temperance. Upon closer examination, the conceptions of virtue, such as Wolf’s, that characterise traditionally virtuous individuals as unnatural, repressed, boring and nauseating, fail in their intellectual dishonesty to accurately present anything resembling the thought of Aristotle or Aquinas. Surveying the world in which we live, with its unprecedented array of excesses, deficiencies and disorders, it would be difficult to argue that the individual and societal peace, harmony and rationality offered by temperance is not exactly what we need.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Temperance Revisited


REFERENCES TO ‘FROM MORAL TO MEDICAL: THE RETREAT OF SELF CONTROL IN AUSTRALIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY’

3 http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ with links ‘Census Data’, ‘Historical Censuses.’ 1910 Year Book religion section is at :
9 Humanae Vitae 14, English text at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html
11 C. McCarthy, Inebriate Retreats: their Origin, Utility, Necessity, and Management, Stilwell and Co., Melbourne
16 Habermas has since given more reason for disquiet, maintaining, in 2002, with uncharacteristic clarity, the importance of the Christian tradition of egalitarianism and love: “Up to this very day there is no alternative to it… Everything else is idle postmodern talk” (Habermas, Jurgen, Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, edited by Eduardo Mendieta, MIT Press, 2002, page. 149).

Bessant and Watts employ the term themata in citing the work of Gerald Holton (1988), apparently unaware that it is a plural noun. Their discussion of Newton relies entirely on Holton and Gadamer, and entirely ignores the context of seventeenth-century epistemology.


Figure 3, ibid.

REFERENCES TO ‘SELF CONTROL IN THE BIG SCHEME OF THINGS’

2 Aristotle 1332a39
5 Homer (Trans 1976 E.V.Rieu) The Odyssey (Harmondsworth: Penguin) p282
6 RSV translation
7 Eph 5.2
8 Augustine writes in De moribus Ecclesiae 156. PL 32 1322 “all virtue is love”.
10 Aristotle opcit I 9 1099b 16
11 ibid 1103b
12 ibid 1103a
16 Content in the following paragraphs is taken from the units I have developed for the Marriage, Education and Family Masters Program provided online by The Institute of Advanced Family Studies within the Internacional University of Cataluña.
17 For more detail: Mullins, A (26 July 2007) ‘Virtue on the Brain’ www.mercatornet.com
20 Aristotle wrote of prudence as the ‘power of forming right judgements’; judgments based on a true and complete understanding of human nature, that he has a non-material transcendent dimension for example.
Much of the collective wisdom of work at Redfield College in support of parents is set out in:
Mullins A (2005) Parenting for Character (Sydney: Finch)
22 Address to the parents of Redfield College.
23 John Paul II (1979) Redemptor Hominis

REFERENCES TO ‘TEMPERANCE AND THE MODERN TEMPER’

4 G. K. Chesterton succinctly captures this tendency in his contention: ‘If there is one thing worse than the modern weakening of major morals, it is the modern strengthening of minor ones.’ Chesterton, G. K. (2000). On Lying in Bed and Other Essays. Calgary, Canada: Bayeux Arts, p.36.
6 Ibid.
7 Harry Clor offers a brief summary of current popular conceptions of temperance positing: ‘More radically, modern viewpoints, needing some attention, dismiss the very idea of moderation as a key to our understanding of the human condition or our flourishing in it; they envision rather different keys. Couldn’t one say that flourishing, at bottom, has nothing to do with any rational balancing but is a matter of vitality – living energetically and spontaneously? Or of audacity – a spirited willingness to take large risks? Or of love, which is inevitably unbalanced?’ Clor, H. (2008). On Moderation: Defending an Ancient Virtue in a Modern World. Texas, USA: Baylor University Press.
9 Ibid. p.81-2. Further reading on the views of Aristotle and Aquinas on humour see The Nicomachean Ethics 1108a25 & 1128b2 & Summa Theologiae II-II, q.168, art. 4.
10 Ibid. p.88.
11 Ibid. p.81-2.
12 Ibid. p.82.
13 Ibid. p.84.
Temperance Revisited

17 Ibid. II-II, q. 142, art. 2.
23 Ibid. p.18.
29 Howard Curzer suggests that contemporary society could benefit greatly from Aristotle’s ‘richer, [and] more nuanced’ understanding of alcoholic intemperance. He contends that both contemporary society and Aristotle distinguish between three types of alcoholics: those who are in denial, those who are not in denial but fail to control themselves, and those who are similarly not in denial but succeed in controlling themselves. While contemporary society stops here, Curzer contends that Aristotle suggests different treatments according to type of alcoholic: ‘Alcoholics should be regarded as sick, pitied, and offered therapy; the intemperate should be deemed incorrigible, blamed, and not treated; the incontinent should be harangued, shamed, and given will-power strengthening self-help books; and finally the continent should be supported, congratulated, and urged to keep up the good work.’ Curzer, H. J. (1997). Aristotle’s Account of the Virtue of Temperance in the Nicomachean Ethics III. 10-11. Journal of the History of Philosophy , 35 (1), p.25-6.
31 Ibid. II-II, q. 148, art. 1.
33 Ibid. II-II, q. 149, art. 2.
35 Aquinas argues against the position that sex is bad in itself because sexual pleasure completely overwhelms reason: ‘The fact that the reason’s free attention to spiritual things cannot be simultaneous with the pleasure does not show that there is something contrary to virtue here, any more than when the reason suspends its activity according to right reason. Otherwise it

36 Howard Curzer plausibly suggests that Aristotle omits the non-physical from his account of temperance ‘in order to prevent overlap with other virtues,’ such as with the virtue of wisdom, which concerns learning, and with the virtue of liberality, which concerns money. This omission, argues Curzer, leaves the Aristotelian account significantly unappreciative of the complexity of the objects of pleasure. Curzer, H. J. (1997). Aristotle's Account of the Virtue of Temperance in the Nicomachean Ethics III. 10-11. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 35 (1), p.6.

37 While Aristotle acknowledges that ‘even in the case of these pleasures can be felt in the right degree, or too much, or too little,’ Aquinas develops this aside into a significant area of concern for temperance. Aristotle. (2004). *The Nicomachean Ethics*. (J. A. Thomson, Trans.) London, UK: Penguin Books, 1118a6-7.


39 Ibid, II-II, q. 142, art. 4.

40 Ibid.


42 Ibid, p.201.


83
<p>| 1 | Martins JF &amp; Saunders JB (eds), <em>Legalising Drugs: Deliverance or Deception?</em> [ISBN 0 7334 0159 7] |
| 2 | Martins JF &amp; Walsh W (eds), <em>Watching the Watchdog: Can the Media Regulate Itself?</em> [ISBN 0 7334 0325 5] |
| 6 | West WJ (ed), <em>Politicians and the Media.</em> [ISBN 0 7334 1244 0] |
| 10 | Sully, The Hon Mr Justice Brian, <em>Drifting toward Upheaval: Current Agitation for Constitutional Change.</em> [ISBN 0 975 0847 2 0] |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Spigelman, The Honourable JJ</td>
<td><em>Shanghai and the West: First Contact.</em></td>
<td>0-980-2902-0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Elias (ed.)</td>
<td><em>Relativism and Human Rights.</em></td>
<td>0-980-2902-1-X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Gonski David</td>
<td><em>The Place of Ethics in a Life of Business</em></td>
<td>0-980-2902-2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Young, John</td>
<td><em>The Scope of Philosophy.</em></td>
<td>0-980-2902-3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Behrendt, Larissa</td>
<td><em>Achieving Social Justice for Aboriginal People in a Civil Society</em></td>
<td>0-980-2902-4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>